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NOTES
THE PROPER THEORY ON WHICH TO SEEK AN INJUNCTION
AGAINST AIRFLIGHTS OVER LAND
The development and increased use of the airplane have given
rise to a conflict between the landowner and the aviation inter-
ests. The courts are guided by two conflicting motives: (1) their
sympathy towards aviation and (2) their desire to guard the
property rights of the landowners in the use and enjoyment of
their property. Accordingly, when an action is brought by a
landowner to recover damages for the flight of airplanes over
his lands, or to enjoin such flights, the courts attempt to reach a
decision which will protect the landowner from the disturbing
features associated with the flights, without causing too great a
handicap to the development of aeronautics. Such an action as
this is usually brought on the theory of trespass, nuisance, or
both. The purpose of this article is to review the decisions1 in-
volving such conflicts of interest and to arrive at the theory the
courts have declared to be proper. The relief sought in most of
these cases is usually the same, namely, injunctive. The prob-
lem involved, however, is upon what theory the court will grant
the relief-trespass, nuisance, or both.
The first case of this type arose in an inferior court of Penn-
sylvania in 1922.2 The action was instituted by a landowner
against certain aviators on the theory of trespass, under a Penn-
sylvania statute making it unlawful for any person willfully to
enter upon any land where the owner had posted notices stating
that the land was private property and warning persons against
trespassing thereon. The court dismissed the suit on the theory
that at the time of the passage of the act the flight of airplanes
over land was not considered a trespass. The court was of the
opinion that "trespass," as used in the statute, meant interfer-
ence with the owner's occupation of his soil, and that flight over
land was not an entry upon the land.
The next case, Johnson v. Curtis Airplane Co.,3 arose one year
later in an inferior court of Minnesota. In this case the land-
owner sought to enjoin the defendant from flying planes over his
land. The action was based upon the theory of trespass. The
ancient maxim, cnjus est solum eJus est usque ad coelum et ad
inferos (to whomever the soil belongs he owns to the sky and
1. There have been only seven cases of this type, all arising within the
last seventeen years.
2. Commonwealth v. Nevin & Smith, 2 Pa. D. & C. 241 (1922); Zollman,
Cases On Air Law (1930) 58.
3. 1928 U. S. Av. Rep. 42.
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also to the depths) 4, was asserted to be the law. The court quickly
disposed of this theory by saying "the upper air is a natural
heritage common to all of the people, and its reasonable use ought
not to be hampered by an ancient artificial maxim."5' The court
further stated that even under the most technical application of
the rule, air flights at a reasonable altitude could not amount to
more than instantaneous constructive trespass, and that modern
progress and great public interests should not be blocked by un-
necessary legal refinements.
Thus from the beginning of this phase of air law there is a
refusal by inferior courts to recognize flights over land as a tres-
pass.6 The Minnesota court seems to imply by using the phrase
"reasonable use" that perhaps nuisance might lie.
It was not until 1930, nine years after the first case involving
this problem had arisen, that such a case was brought before a
higher state court. In Smithb v. New England Aircraft Co.,
Inc.,7 decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from flying
over their land and from using a field adjacent to the plain-
tiffs' land as a flying field. The uncontested facts were that the
defendants' planes on take-offs and landings flew at a low alti-
tude over certain unused brush land of the plaintiffs and that
on a few occasions the defendants' planes flew at an altitude less
than five hundred feet over the plaintiffs' house. The plaintiffs
brought their action on the basis of nuisance and trespass, but
confined their argument to the question of trespass. They main-
tained that the continuance of the trespass, in itself, constituted
an abatable nuisance.7' The court held that the flying of the air-
planes at a low altitude in take-offs and landings constituted a
trespass, but refused to grant an injunction because plaintiffs
failed to prove any property damage or material discomforts re-
sulting therefrom. The court appeared to be of the opinion that
although there might be a technical trespass, nevertheless, the
plaintiffs should not be entitled to injunctive relief as the injury
was not certain and substantial, but rather slight and theoreti-
4. The author of this maxim is unknown. For a history of the develop-
ment of this maxim see, Wherry & Condon, Air Travel & Trespass (1934)
68 U. S. L. Rev. 78. It is not within the scope of this article to discuss
this maxim.
5. Supra, note 3, 44.
6. These were the only two cases on this phase of air law until 1930.
7. 270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385 (1930).
7a. A nuisance which is created as a result of continual trespass is dis-
tinguished in this case from the types of nuisances which are usually in-
volved, such as noise, dust, wind, etc.
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cal. The court assumed, however, that private ownership of air-
space extended to all reasonable heights above the land and that
flights within this distance constituted trespass.7b
In regard to the nuisance theory which the plaintiffs failed to
argue,8 the court's statement in dismissing the point is note-
worthy:
"There is no sound ground for injunctive relief on the theory
that the acts of the defendants constituted a nuisance. The
law affords no rigid rule to be used as a test in all instances
of alleged nuisance. It is elastic. It requires only that which
is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances. The noise,
proximity and number of aircrafts have not been such in
the case at bar as to be harmful to the health or comfort of
ordinary people. Fright and apprehension of personal
danger or of injury to live stock or property are not pres-
ent."9
From this statement the court seemed to imply that relief would
be given on the nuisance theory under the proper set of facts,
although there is no affirmative statement to that effect.0
The first case of this nature decided by a federal court was
Swetland v. Curtis Airport Corp."' The action was instituted on
two counts, nuisance and trespass. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin
the defendant from building an airport next to their land. In
spite of the institution of the plaintiffs' action, the defendant con-
tinued with its plans and established an airport. The District
Court allowed the airport to remain, but enjoined the defendant
from permitting dust from the operation of the airport to fly
over the plaintiffs' property in annoying quantities, and from
dropping circulars while flying over plaintiffs' land. On appeal
the court granted an injunction against using the property next
to the plaintiffs' land for an airport. The theory of the court
was that the operation of the airport, even though properly con-
ducted, would so materially interfere with the enjoyment of the
7b. The court failed to characterize flights between 100 feet and 500 feet
as legal or illegal.
8. The court refused to go into a complete discussion of this point as the
"nuisance theory" was not argued by the plaintiffs.
9. Supra, note 7, 1. c. 518.
10. Nuisance may consist of disturbance of privacy, imminence of danger,
or disturbance by noise, wind, or dust. Logan, Aircraft Law Made Plain(1928) 24. The case of Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., Inc., supra,
note 7, indicates that continual trespass is not considered an abatable
nuisance. The mere continuance of flights over land without any other dis-
turbance is not a nuisance.
11. 55 F (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 6, 1932).
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plaintiffs' property as to constitute an abatable nuisance.11f The
court, however, stated that it was the traditional policy of the
courts to adapt social needs to the times and that every flight
over the land of another did not constitute a trespass. The court
also said that the air is divided into two strata, that which the
landowner may reasonably expect to use or occupy himself, and
that which he may not reasonably expect to use. The former, the
court termed the upper stratum and the latter it termed the lower
stratum. The court went on to say that a flight through the
lower stratum might impose such a servitude upon the landown-
er's use and enjoyment of the surface as to constitute a tres-
pass, 12 but that as to flight through the upper stratum the land-
owner has no right other than to prevent its use by others to the
extent of an unreasonable interference with his complete enjoy-
ment of the surface. The court, therefore, was of the opinion
that the proper remedy is an action for the abatement of nui-
sance and not for the enjoining of trespass, regardless of the alti-
tude of the flights.
Immediately following this decision a similar case was decided
in the Supreme Court of Georgia.13 In the Georgia case the land-
ing field had already been established and the dust caused by the
planes had affected the plaintiff's land and had also impaired the
health of the plaintiff's wife. The Georgia court followed the de-
cision of the Swetland case by stating that aerial navigation over
the land of another cannot be said to be a trespass without tak-
ing into consideration the question of altitude. It may or may
not be a trespass according to all the circumstances including
altitude. Even when the act does not constitute a trespass, it
may amount to a nuisance, as where it occasions hurt, inconveni-
ence, or damage to the occupant below.14 The Georgia court re-
fused to enjoin the flying of the aircraft over the plaintiff's land,
but did enjoin the defendant from flying planes so as to cause
injury to the plaintiff and his land. The court seemed to recog-
nize the greater flexibility of a nuisance action. It, therefore,
11a. The court took into consideration all the disturbances which are part
of an airport, lights, noise, dust, etc., and arrived at the conclusion that it
would be an interference with the landowner's rights.
12. This statement is in accord with Smith v. New England Aircraft,
supra, note 7.
13. Thrastier v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817 (1934).
14. Ibid., 1. c. 530.
15. The court enjoined the flying of the planes in such a manner as to
cause dust to settle on the plaintiffs' land. This is an example of the desire
of the courts to reach a decision which protects both the landowner and the
development of aviation.
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was able to enjoin the objectionable features of the flights with-
out prohibiting all flights over the land."
The most recent cases in this field are two federal cases, Cory
v. Physical Culture Hotel, Inc.,'7 and Hinman v. Pacific Air
Transport.' The former case adopts without any qualifications
the rule laid down in the Swetland case. It holds that flights above
the space actually occupied and used by the landowner when they
interfere with his complete enjoyment of the surface are only
subject to an action of nuisance. The latter case, however, was
not so easily disposed of. The plaintiff in the Hinman case sought
an injunction to prevent low flying over his land. His action was
based on the theory of trespass. The court denied the injunction
as no actual damage was shown. In order to reach the conclu-
sion that actual damage must be shown before injunctive relief
will be granted, the court had to change the orthodox theory of
trespass.", The court said:
"This case differs from the usual case of enjoining a tres-
pass. Ordinarily if a trespass is committed upon land, the
plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages without proving or
alleging any actual damage. In the instant case, travers-
ing the airspace above appellants' land is not, of itself, a
trespass at all, but it is a lawful act unless it is done under
circumstances which will cause injury to appellants' pos-
sessions. Appellants do not, therefore, in their bill state a
case of trespass unless they allege a case of actual and sub-
stantial damage. '20
The court recognized that the orthodox definition of trespass
would not apply in this type of case, and redefined trespass so
that it would apply. This new definition was entirely unneces-
sary, for the facts supported the regular nuisance action.21 This
decision seems to cause a conflict. But if it is kept in mind that
there is only a change in the meaning of the word trespass and
16. For a good discussion of the effect of Thrasher v. City of Alanta,
see Logan, Recent Developments in Aeronautical Law (1934) 5 J. Air Law
548.
17. 14 F. Supp. 977 (D. C. W. D. N. Y., 1936).
18. Complete title of case, Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, Hinman v.
United Air Lines Transport, 84 F. (2d) 755 (C. C. A. 9, 1936), certiorari
denied Feb. 1, 1937, 299 U. S-.
19. In trespass actual damage or loss to the owner has nothing to do
with the giving of the right of action. It is otherwise as to nuisance for in
this case detriment is the essence of the action. Logan, Aircraft Law Made
Plain (1928) 23.
20. Supra, note 18, 758.
21. Supra, note 19.
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not in the principles laid down in the previous cases, no difficulty
is encountered.
From a review of these cases the following conclusions can be
drawn: first, that airspace is divided into two divisions, the lower
and upper strata; second, that where injury to the use and en-joyment of the land is caused by the flight of airplanes over the
land, relief can be had on the theory of nuisance regardless of
the stratum through which the flight was made; third, that re-
lief on the theory of trespass is limited solely to flights through
the lower stratum; fourth, that in instituting an action it would
be safest to bring the action on both counts, nuisance and tres-
pass. A trespass count should be included although the trend is
towards eliminating actions upon the trespass theory. A case
of this type will probably be one of first instance in the particu-
lar jurisdiction and it is possible that the court will uphold a
trespass action. The trespass count, however, is merely a safety
measure and the case should be based on the nuisance theory.2
OTIS J. GARLAND.
22. For suggested theories on the handling of such situations see Flagg,
Airspace Ownership and The Right To Flight (1932) 3 J. Air Law 400.
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